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Abstract
We propose a model of an incomplete markets economy with pro-
duction, in which the firm acts as financial innovator by issuing claims
against its stock. The firm’s objective is to maximize its adjusted value,
which is the sum of the market value and the shareholders’ surplus from
their trades in the stock markets. If a firm maximizes its adjusted value,
then its financial policy is relevant (i.e., Modigliani-Miller theorem does
not hold), equilibrium outcomes are stable to shareholders’ renegotiation
and endogenously incomplete markets typically arise at the equilibrium.
If the firm is competitive in the financial markets, the adjusted value
coincides with the Grossman-Hart objective.
Keywords: firm’s objective, incomplete markets, shareholder preferences
JEL classification: D21, D52, G20, L21
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1 Introduction
When the financial markets are complete, all shareholders of a perfectly compet-
itive firm attach the same value to any given investment plan and unanimously
agree that market value maximizing production plans are the optimal ones.
For a firm that has market power, the price effect of a production decision may
generates a conflict between the interests of shareholders as consumers and
as receivers of the firm’s dividends. That is because higher profits may come
at the expense of higher prices for some goods that a shareholder consumes
(or lower prices for the goods he/she owns and sells). This may render value
maximization undesired –from shareholders’ points of view– and thus an un-
justified objective. Alternative objectives for the imperfectly competitive firm
were defined, for example, in [1] and [8].
Market incompleteness adds a new dimension to the problem, because in
such an environment a firm’s production decision not only modifies the supply
of consumption goods in the economy, but it may also change the asset span.
The firm’s equity contract as well as other securities that the firm may issue
to finance its production are risk-hedging instruments that may not be replica-
ble by a portfolio of the other traded securities. In that case, the firm-issued
securities cannot be priced in the existing markets and, as a result, different
shareholders may attach different values to the same investment/production
plan. When evaluating a particular production plan, every shareholder assesses
not only its impact on the firm’s market value and the change in relative prices
that it induces, but also the risk-hedging opportunities that the firm-issued se-
curities offer. It may be that the value maximizing production plan is a riskier
alternative than some other plan, which generates a lower value. Depending
on their wealth, preferences and attitudes toward risk, different shareholders
may favor lower risk over higher market value, or the other way round. These
three effects (which we call the income, price and portfolio risk effects, respec-
tively) may influence a shareholder’s wealth differently – this is the source of
shareholder’s conflict of interests – and have different impact on different share-
holders – which generates the disagreement among them. Note that the first
two effects can arise in complete and incomplete markets. The third effect
arises only in incomplete markets.
A special case of production under incomplete markets occurs when the
firm’s production set is contained in the asset span (a condition known in the
literature as “spanning property”). In this case, the firm’s decisions do not af-
fect the asset market structure and firm’s problem is then essentially the same
as in complete markets (see, for example, Ekern-Wilson [11], Leland, [16], Rad-
ner, [20] and chapter 6 in Magill-Quinzii [18]). Therefore, a firm’s production
decision can have only an income and/or a price effect on its shareholders’
wealth, but no portfolio risk effect.
The following diagram summarizes the possible effects that a firm’s choice
may have on its shareholders’ wealth, depending on the environment in which
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the firm acts and its market power.
complete incomplete markets
markets spanning no spanning
Perfectly competitive
income income income+risk
(no market power)
Market power income+price income+price income+price+risk
Shareholders unanimously approve profit maximization whenever the firm’s
choices have only an income effect on their wealth. Disagreement among share-
holders concerning the firm’s objective and incompatibility of profit maximiza-
tion with the shareholders’ interests may arise if two or more effects are present.
The above discussion points out to the fact that, as soon as one leaves the
idealistic environment of complete and perfectly competitive markets, profit/value
maximization by a privately owned firm may be incompatible with the prefer-
ences of that firm’s shareholders and thus it is an unjustified and inadequate
objective for firms that have market power or act in an incomplete markets
environment (or both).
The first attempts to solve this problem (in a more general framework than
multiplicative uncertainty or spanning) were made by Dre`ze [9] and later Gross-
man and Hart [14]. For two-period economies with uncertainty and incom-
plete financial markets, Dre`ze [9] proposed a Pareto-Nash criterion to discard
“unreasonable” (from the shareholders’ point of view) choices of a perfectly
competitive firm. The criterion requires that the firm’s decision respect the
unanimity among shareholders, provided that they can make side payments in
consumption good at date 0 to achieve unanimity. Shareholders are not allowed,
however, to make any changes in their portfolio holdings, including their share
holdings. Dre`ze interpreted that as respecting the firm’s final shareholders’
interests and proved that this requirement is equivalent to maximizing firm’s
value, taking as given a system of state prices that is a weighted average of the
shareholders’ marginal rates of substitution, with weights equal to their final
shares.
The equilibrium in which firms follow Dre`ze’s objective satisfies the first
order conditions for constrained Pareto optimality. However, because of the
non-convexity of the constrained feasible set, the first order conditions may not
be sufficient for optimality. As a consequence, at a Dre`ze equilibrium firm’s
final shareholders may have incentives to re-trade their shares. In other words,
there is a conflict between the interests of a consumer as a final shareholder
of the firm and his interests as an initial shareholder1. This conflict creates
problems for the extension of the model to environments with multiple trading
periods, where one period’s final shareholders become the next period’s initial
1 Dierker-Dierker-Grodal proved that when following Dre`ze’s objective, the firm may in
fact select a production plan at which the initial shareholders’ surplus is minimized (see [6]).
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shareholders2.
As a first step toward an extension of Dre`ze model to an environment
with more than one trading period, Grossman and Hart [14] pointed out to
the necessity of investigating the problem from the perspective of the initial
shareholders. Since initial shareholders may eventually trade their shares, they
need to have some expectations, or perceptions about shares’ prices, as being
related to the choice of the production plans. Hence, the authors introduced
the “competitive price perceptions” assumption. Under competitive price per-
ceptions, it is assumed that every consumer uses his own present-value vector
(normalized gradient of his utility) as state prices to evaluate payoffs that are
not in the asset span. As pointed out by the authors themselves, competitive
price perceptions make shareholders expect that the benefits they accrue from
any dividend stream are exactly compensated by its price. The shareholders are
therefore neglecting the spanning, or risk-hedging opportunities that a certain
dividend stream offers. A shareholder that has competitive price perceptions
wants his/her firm to maximize its value, computed at his/her vector of state
prices, and is indifferent among the policies that finance that plan. Value max-
imization under the state prices that are the weighted average of shareholders’
marginal rates of substitution (with weights equal to their initial shares) is
proved to achieve efficiency, from the initial shareholders’ point of view, given
their price perceptions.
Although very elegant and appealing, the Dre`ze’s and Grossman and Hart’s
formulations of a firm’s objective suffer from the drawback that they completely
eliminate a firm’s incentives to financially innovate, even in incomplete markets.
In both Dre`ze’s and Grossman and Hart’s models, a firm’s financial policy is
irrelevant. In Dre`ze’s model, final shareholders make the decisions about the
firm’s policy after the financial markets close and no further trade in securities
takes place. In Grossman and Hart’s model, the absence of the incentives to
innovate comes from the particular form of shareholders’ price perceptions.
We propose a model of a two-date incomplete markets economy with pro-
duction, in which the firm’s decisions are taken by a group of investors, called
the control group. We introduce, as the objective of a privately owned firm,
the maximization of the C-adjusted value (where C stands for the set of firm’s
control group members). The C-adjusted value is the value of the firm as per-
ceived by the members of the firm’s control group. This does not, in general,
coincide with the standard market value. Instead, the C-adjusted value is the
sum of the firm’s net market value and the surplus accrued by the members of
the control group from their transactions in the financial markets. This sur-
plus can come from two different sources. One is the difference in the prices
of traded securities that the firm’s choices might generate. The second, is the
2Bonnisseau and Lachiri [3] extends Dre´ze criterion to a multiperiod environment. The
authors propose an objective for the firm that is derived from the first order conditions of
the non-convex constrained Pareto optimal problem (as Dreze’s objective is). However, the
authors do not relate that objective to the preferences of any group of shareholders.
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firm’s equity contract, which may not be replicable by a portfolio of the other
traded securities and thus represents a new risk-hedging instrument. By taking
into account these surpluses, the C-adjusted value accounts not only for the
income effect (captured by the firm’s market value), but also the price and risk
effects that the firm’s choices have on the shareholders’ wealth.
The C-adjusted value generalizes Dre`ze and Grossman-Hart objectives, in
the sense that it coincides with those if the firm does not have market power.
If, in addition, markets are complete, then the C-adjusted value coincides with
profit maximization.
We show that equilibria in which the firm maximizes its C-adjusted value
generate production-financial plans that are Pareto efficient from the point of
view of the members of the control group. This means that the members of
the control group cannot all achieve higher utilities by switching to a different
production plan and making after-trade, date-0 transfers among themselves.
Although this efficiency concept is based on the same idea as the criteria used
by Dre`ze, and Grossman and Hart, it differs from those in several respects.
It differs from Dre`ze’s notion of shareholder-efficiency in that shareholders
are allowed to optimally change their portfolio holdings when pondering two
production-financial policies. It also differs from Grossman-Hart’s criterion in
the way shareholder’s preferences over production plans are defined. In Gross-
man and Hart, shareholders use their competitive price perceptions to derive
their preferences over firm’s production plans. Competitive price perceptions
are rational in the sense that they are fulfilled at the equilibrium point; however,
they may be false everywhere else. In this paper, we are imposing a stronger
version of rationality: the control group’s price perceptions are assumed to be
fulfilled at any point in the firm’s feasible set, not only at the equilibrium one.
In other words, members of the control group correctly understand (or antici-
pate) the effect of the firm’s production-financial decisions on securities prices.
By doing that, they are able to account for the benefits of the new financial
instruments that their firm creates.
In contrast to Dre`ze and Grossman-Hart objectives, maximization of the
C-adjusted value makes the financial policy of the firm relevant. Therefore,
the firm acts as a financial innovator by issuing claims against its stock. It
should be emphasized here that the model accommodates a large variety of
types of firms. In particular, it is not restricted to production units in the
usual sense. The firm can be, for example, a financial firm which does not
supply any consumption goods to the market, but only has a “technology” for
creating securities. Financial intermediaries, as described for example in Bisin
[2], are particular firms, whose “production” set consists of the null vector and
which are owned by a single individual who only cares about, and is endowed
with some amount of the date 0 consumption good. More generally, a financial
intermediary can be modeled as a firm with a singleton (but non-zero) pro-
duction set, Y = {(y0, y1, ...yS)} where (y1, ...yS) is the payoff of a security the
intermediary owns and y0 is the cost it incurs from selling that (or the claims
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against it) in the market. It should also be pointed out that the model ab-
stracts from more sophisticated transaction cost schemes, bid-ask spreads and
taxing issues that are generally associated with issuing securities and focuses
instead on the investors’ need for better risk-hedging opportunities and general
equilibrium price effects as sources of the incentives to innovate.
It is shown that markets are, typically, incomplete at the equilibrium.
However, there are special cases in which equilibria are Pareto optimal and thus
markets are effectively complete3. Two such cases correspond to CAPM and
an economy in which consumers preferences are given by linear risk tolerance
expected utility functions. In general, however, one should expect an incomplete
and suboptimal market structure to arise in the equilibrium. Shareholders’
unanimity is obtained if the firm is competitive in the goods market and has
a Diamond-type technology or if consumers have mean-variance of linear risk
tolerance utilities.
The paper is organized as follows. An example that illustrates the inad-
equacy of value maximization as the objective of a monopolistic firm in in-
complete markets is presented in section 2. Section 3 introduces the notion
of C-adjusted value for a simplified model, in which firm’s financial policy is
restricted to issuing equity only. The full model, in which firm has access to
different financial policies to finance its production is presented in section 4.
Section 5 identifies sufficient conditions for obtaining shareholders’ unanimity
and shows that the C-adjusted value coincides with Dre`ze and Grossman-Hart’s
objectives if firm does not have market power. Finally, section 6 tackles the
problems of the existence and efficiency of the equilibrium.
2 Shareholders’ Interest and Firm’s Objective:
An Example
We start with an example which illustrates the difficulties posed by the decision
problem of a privately owned firm that acts in an incomplete markets environ-
ment. The example is a slight modification of an example in Duffie, [10] (page
121).
Eample 1
Consider an economy that lasts over two periods, t = 0, 1, with two possible
states at date 1: s = 1, 2. There is only one consumption good per date and
state. The economy is populated by two consumers/investors and one firm with
the following characteristics:
3There does not seem to be a standard notion of effectively complete markets in the
literature. I am using here Elul’s definition. As stated in [12], markets are effectively complete
if every equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. For an alternative definition, the reader is
referred to LeRoy and Werner [17].
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u1 (c) = (c0)
3
c1 (c2)
2
, u2 (c) = (c0)
3 (c1)
2
c2,
ω1 = ω2 = (1, 0, 0) , δ1 = δ2 =
1
2
,
Y =
{
y ∈ R− × R2+ | (y1)2 + (y2)2 ≤ −y0
}
,
where ωi and δi denote investor i’s endowment of goods and shares of the firm’s
stock, respectively. The only way to transfer consumption among dates/states
is through trade in firm’s shares. Investors are therefore unable to obtain every
payoff stream in R2 through stock market transactions and thus markets are
incomplete.
Investors choose share holdings and consumption for each date/state. It
is assumed that they behave competitively and thus maximize their utilities
within their budget constraints, taking the price of the firm’s shares as given.
Simple computations show that, if the firm chooses production plan y =
(y0, y1, y2) ∈ Y and does not issue additional shares, a market clearing price
exists if and only if y0 > −2 and in that case it is equal to 2+ y0. At this price,
investors do not trade firm’s shares, and their indirect utilities are: U1(y) =(
1
2
)6
(2 + y0)
6
y1 (y2)
2, U2(y) =
(
1
2
)6
(2 + y0)
6 (y1)
2
y2. The firm’s equilibrium
net market value is V (y) = y0 + (2 + y0) = 2 (1 + y0) . Figure 1 depicts the
pairs of exchange equilibrium indirect utilities for every possible value of y ∈
Y ∩ ((−2, 0]× R2+) .
Figure 1: Exchange equilibrium utilities
As the picture shows, the two owners of the firm disagree on the most
preferred production plan. If investor 1 were the only one deciding on the
firm’s production plan (i.e., he were the controller of the firm), then he would
choose yA =
(
−2
3
,
√
2
3
, 2
3
)
= argmaxU1(y), which corresponds to point A on
the graph. If, instead, investor 2 controlled the firm, she would choose yB =
8
(
−2
3
, 2
3
,
√
2
3
)
= argmaxU2(y), i.e., point B. If they both control the firm, their
disagreement poses problems for defining an appropriate objective for the firm.
If the firm’s objective were to maximize its market value, the optimal choice
would be y∗ = 0. This choice gives firm’s owners an utility of 0 and thus
the value maximizing production plan is the worst possible outcome for each
owner.
Although an unanimously approved plan does not exist, we believe that
a desirable property of an equilibrium outcome in this environment is that
of being, at least, Pareto undominated from the shareholders’ point of view.
On these grounds, one must eliminate, as possible equilibrium outcomes, all
points that do not lie along the frontier between the points A and B. If, for
instance, point E were the equilibrium outcome then shareholders would have
an incentive to renegotiate to a better alternative in the shaded area of figure
2, and thus the firm would be vulnerable to a take-over. For this reason we
view point E as an “unstable” and thus undesirable equilibrium outcome.
We are proposing here an objective for the firm which selects (some) pro-
duction plans that are efficient from the shareholders’ point of view. Clearly,
the maximization of a weighted average of the shareholders’ indirect utilities
has this property. However, different utility representations of shareholders’
preferences would generate different objectives for the firm and different opti-
mal choices: a highly undesirable feature! We are therefore interested in finding
an objective for the firm which is independent of the utility representations of
shareholders’ preferences, while still delivering equilibrium outcomes that are
stable to shareholders’ renegotiation4. This paper proposes a way of construct-
ing such an objective.
3 The Simplified Model: Equity-Financed Pro-
duction
Consider an economy that lasts for two periods, t = 0, 1. There are S possible
states of nature at date 1 and only one non-storable consumption good per date
and state.
The economy is populated by I consumers/investors, and there is one firm.
Firm’s production possibilities are described by the convex and closed subset
Y ⊆ R− × RS+. A typical element of Y is of the form y = (y0, y1, ...yS) ,
where −y0 represents the amount of input put into production (or investment
made) at date 0, and ys is the amount of output produced at date 1 if state s
occurs. Investors are characterized by their preferences over state contingent
consumption plans and their endowments of goods and shares in the firm’s
profits. Investor i is endowed with the vector ωi = (ωi0, ω
i
1, ..., ω
i
S) ∈ RS+1++
4Profit (or value) maximization depends only on the market prices and thus is utility-
independent. However, it cannot be a candidate for such an objective because, as proved by
example 1, it is not consistent with the shareholders’ preferences.
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of state-contingent consumption goods and δi ∈ [0, 1] shares in firm’s profits.
His/Her preferences over consumption streams c = (c0, c1, ...cS) ∈ RS+1+ are
represented by the continuously differentiable, increasing in every argument
and strictly quasi-concave utility function ui : RS+1+ → R.
Let C ⊆ I5 be the set of investors who control firm’s decisions; we call
them the control group. One could think of C as being, for example, the Board
of Directors. Members of the control group can be shareholders as well as non-
shareholders of the firm (for example, a non-shareholder employee of the firm
can be a member of the control group). Let δC
def
=
∑
i∈C δ
i be the aggregate
share holdings by members of the control group.
The only way of transferring consumption among dates/states is through
trade in firm’s shares. They are available for trade at time 0 and pay dividends
at time 1. Short sale of firm’s shares is allowed for up to L units, where L ∈
[0,+∞] is exogenously given. L = +∞ means that unlimited short sales are
allowed.
For now, it is assumed that the firm’s sole decision is to select a feasible
production plan y ∈ Y (i.e., it is implicitly assumed that the firm finances its
production/investment only by issuing equity). In section 4 we relax this as-
sumption and analyze the situation in which the firm takes not only production,
but also more complex financial decisions.
Investors choose their share holdings and the amount of goods they want
to consume in every date/state such that to maximize their utilities and satisfy
their budget constraints at every date and state. It is assumed that the number
of investors, I, is large enough, so that their behavior can be approximated by
the familiar price taking hypothesis. This means that they act in the belief
that their portfolio and consumption decisions do not affect the price of the
security available for trade in the assets market. However, those investors that
are members of the control group do understand the effect of firm’s production
choices on the share price. We assume that, for every production plan that
the firm may choose, they are able to anticipate correctly (some of) the corre-
sponding equilibrium share price(s). We say that members of the control group
have rational price perceptions.
Given some production plan, y, and price of shares, v, consider agent i’s
optimization problem as an investor,
maxθ,c u
i(c)
s.t. c0 + θv = ω0 + δ
i (v + y0)
cs = ωs + θys s = 1, .., S
θ ≥ −L, c0, c1, ...cS ≥ 0,
(1)
and let
(
ci (y, v) , θi (y, v)
)
be its solution.
An equilibrium price of the stock-exchange economy corresponding to y is
5We are making the usual abuse of notation by using the same symbol to denote a finite
set and the number of its elements. Hence we assume that I = {1, 2, ..., I} .
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any real number, v, that solves:
∑I
i=1 θ
i (y, v) = 1. Let
∏˜
(y) denote the set
of all solutions.
∏˜
is thus a correspondence from Y to R. Let Ŷ be the set of
production plans for which
∏˜
(y) is non-empty.
To simplify matters, we assume here that the control group’s (rational) price
perception is a particular measurable selection, Π, from
∏˜
. [In the next section
we will consider the situation in which the control group holds non-degenerate
beliefs over possible equilibrium prices.] Therefore Π : Ŷ → R is such that
Π (y) ∈ ∏˜ (y) , ∀y ∈ Ŷ . Let ci (y) def= ci (y,Π(y)) and θi (y) def= θi (y,Π(y)) .
The price perception Π and utilities (ui)i∈C induce members’ preferences
over firm’s production plans as represented by the indirect utilities V iΠ : Ŷ → R,
where V iΠ(y)
def
= ui(ci), for every i ∈ C.
The next definition introduces our notion of C-efficiency, i.e., efficiency
from the control group members’ point of view. The basic idea is the following.
Suppose that the economy is at a status-quo at which the firm’s production plan
is y¯. If there exists an alternative plan, y, and a system of date-0, after-trade
side payments that improve every member’s utility, then the control group
has an incentive to move away from the status-quo plan by adopting y and
implementing the transfers. We are interested in production plans y¯ that are
stable to such arrangements. Those production plans are called C-efficient.
Definition 3.1 A production plan y ∈ Y is C-efficient (given the price per-
ception Π) if there does not exist a vector
(
y, (τ i)i∈C
)
consisting of a production
plan y ∈ Y and date-0 transfers (τ i)i∈C ∈ RC satisfying:
i)
∑
τ i ≤ 0,
ii) ui(ci(y) + τ ie0) ≥ V iΠ (y) for every i ∈ C,
iii) uj (ci (y) + τ ie0) > V
i
Π (y) for some j ∈ C,
where e0 = (1, 0, ..., 0) ∈ RS+1.
Note that this concept of C-efficiency is different from Dre`ze’s original con-
cept in that investors are allowed to adjust their shares in response to a proposed
change in the production plan of the firm. It also differs from Grossman-Hart’s
concept in the type of price perceptions used for defining members’ preferences
over production plans.
In the remaining of this section we construct an objective of the firm that
generates C-efficient production plans in equilibrium. To do that we measure
– in units of date-0 consumption – the change in each investor’s welfare due to
a change of the production plan from y˜ to y.
Let εi(y˜, y) denote the minimal amount of date-0 consumption good that
investor i must be compensated with, in order to accept a change from y˜ to y
(i.e., to accept a change from the consumption plan ci(y˜,Π(y˜)) to ci(y,Π(y))).
Thus εi(y˜, y) satisfies:
ui(ci0(y) + ε
i(y˜, y), ci1(y)) = ui(ci0(y˜), c
i1(y˜)). (2)
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Clearly, εi(y˜, y) ≥ 0 if and only if investor i weakly prefers production plan y˜
to y, i.e., V iΠ (y˜) ≥ V iΠ (y) .
Since ui is quasi-concave, relation (2) implies:
(
(ci0(y) + ε
i(y˜, y), ci1(y)− (ci0(y˜), ci1(y˜))
)∇ui(ci0(y˜), ci1(y˜)) ≥ 0, (3)
where ∇ui denotes the gradient of ui. Using investor i’s budget constraints and
rearranging terms, (3) becomes:
εi(y˜, y) ≥ [δi (Π (y˜) + y˜0) + θi (y˜) (MRSi(y˜)y˜1 − Π(y˜))]−
− [δi (Π (y) + y0) + θi (y) (MRSi(y˜)y1 − Π(y))] ,
whereMRSi(y˜)
def
= MRSi (ci (y˜)) =
(
∂1u
i(eci)
∂0ui(eci)
, ...,
∂Su
i(eci)
∂0ui(eci)
)
is investor i’s marginal
rate of substitution between consumption at date 1 and consumption at date
0.
Let W i
ey (y)
def
= δi (Π (y) + y0) + θ
i (y) (MRSi(y˜)y1 − Π(y)). If W i
ey (y˜) ≥
W i
ey (y) then ε
i(y˜, y) ≥ 0 and thus investor i weakly prefers6 production plan y˜
over y.
Definition 3.2 For a given price perception Π and every y˜, y ∈ Ŷ let
VCey,Π(y) def=
∑
i∈C
W iey (y) = δC (Π (y) + y0) +
∑
i∈C
θi (y)
(
MRSi (y˜) y1 − Π(y)) ,
where δC
def
=
∑
i∈C δ
i is the initial aggregate share holding of the control group.
VC
ey,Π(y) is called the C-adjusted value of y at y˜.
The C-adjusted value is the firm’s value as perceived by the members of
the control group. It is the sum of the market value of the control group’s
initial share of the firm, δC (Π (y) + y0) , and the value that the control group
attributes, at y˜, to trading in firm’s common stock as a risk-hedging instru-
ment, ∑
i∈C
θi (y)
(
MRSi (y˜) y1 − Π(y)) . (4)
For every i, MRSi (y˜) y1 is an estimate of the investor i’s valuation of the secu-
rity y1, and thus MRSi (y˜) y1−Π(y) is a measure of the surplus, to investor i,
from purchasing one unit of the security y1. Therefore, expression (4) represents
the control group’s aggregate surplus from trading firm’s equity.
6Note, however, thatWi
ey : Ŷ → R is not a utility representation of investor i’s preferences
over production plans since V iΠ (y˜) ≥ V iΠ (y) does not necessarily imply Wiey (y˜) ≥ Wiey (y) .
12
Accounting for this surplus in the firm’s objective is essential for obtaining
C-efficient production plans at the equilibrium and the significance of the firm’s
financial policy (see section 6). Grossman-Hart’s assumption of “competitive
price perceptions” implies that investors behave as if trading in firm’s common
stock generates no surplus (or loss) for them. Therefore, term (4) is neglected
from the computation of the firm’s objective. As we will show in section 5,
this is an entitled omission if the firm is competitive. However, if the firm has
some market power, the surplus given by formula (4) is different than zero and
should be taken into account.
If C = I, the C-adjusted value is
VIy,Π(y) = y0 +
[∑
i∈I
θi (y)MRSi
(
ci
)]
y1.
This is the firm’s market value computed under a system of state prices equal
to the average of the shareholders’ marginal rates of substitutions weighted by
their final share holdings. This is similar to Dre`ze objective, except that the
weights vary with y. Thus, in contrast to Dre`ze and Grossman-Hart objectives7,
the C-adjusted value is not a linear function of y.
Definition 3.3 An equilibrium of the production economy consistent with
the control group’s price perception Π is any vector
(
y,
(
ci, θ
i
)
i∈I
, v
)
∈ Ŷ ×(
RS+ × R
)I × R+ that satisfies the following conditions:
i.
(
ci, θ
i
)
i∈I
solves (1) given the price v,
ii. v = Π(y) ,
iii. y ∈ argmaxy∈bY VCy,Π(y),
iv.
∑
i∈I c
i = y +
∑
i∈I ω
i.
Theorem 3.4 In every equilibrium the firm’s production plan is C-efficient.
The proof of this proposition is given in section 4.4 in a more general
context.
For C = I theorem 3.4 is a first welfare theorem type of result. It says that
the equilibria of the production economy areminimally constrained efficient8, in
the sense that the equilibrium allocations cannot be improved upon by a social
7With the notation of this paper, Dre`ze’s objective is Dy(y) = y0 +[∑
i∈I θ
i (y˜)MRSi (y˜)
]
y1, while Grossman-Hart’s is GHy(y) = y0 +
[∑
i∈I δ
iMRSi (y˜)
]
y1.
8The notion of minimal constrained efficiency was first introduced (to the best of my
knowledge) by Dierker, Dierker and Grodal in [7]
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planner who can choose the production plan and redistribute consumption at
date 0, but has to use the markets to purchase the date-1 consumption for every
investor. The formal definition of this efficiency concept follows.
Definition 3.5 An allocation
(
y,
(
ci0, c
i1 (y)
)
i∈I
)
is minimally constrained ef-
ficient given Π if and only if:
1.
∑
i∈I c
i
0 =
∑
i∈I ω
i
0 + y0,
2. there does not exist a Pareto superior allocation
(
y, (ci0, c
i1 (y))i∈I
)
such
that
∑
i∈I c
i
0 =
∑
i∈I ω
i
0 + y0.
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of theorem 3.4.
Corollary 3.6 If C = I, every equilibrium is minimally constrained efficient.
Note that minimal constrained efficiency is weaker than constrained Pareto
optimality. A planner could, potentially, improve upon a minimally constrained
efficient allocation by redistributing shares (or, equivalently, using before trade
date-0 transfers). Therefore, even when C = I, equilibria in which the firm
maximizes its C-adjusted value are not, in general, constrained Pareto optimal.
Example 2 To illustrate the results of this section, consider again the
example of section 2. If C = {1} (or C = {2}), the unique C-efficient out-
come is point A (respectively B). This corresponds to the production plan
yA =
(
−2
3
,
√
2
3
, 2
3
)
(respectively yB =
(
−2
3
, 2
3
,
√
2
3
)
). The firm’s C-adjusted
value (at yA) is V{1}yA (y) = 2 (1 + y0) + 13
(√
2y1 + 2y2
)
, which is maximized at(
−2
3
,
√
2
3
, 2
3
)
. Thus yA is the unique equilibrium production plan if C = {1}.
Suppose now that C = {1, 2} .An allocation (y, (c10, 12y1, 12y2) , (c20, 12y1, 12y2))
is minimally constrained efficient (MCE in the sequel) if and only if (y, c10, c
2
0)
solves
max
λu1
(
c10,
1
2
y1,
1
2
y2
)
+ (1− λ)u2
(
c20,
1
2
y1,
1
2
y2
)
| c10 + c20 = 2 + y0
c10, c
2
0 ≥ 0

for some λ ∈ [0, 1] . The parametric equation of the MCE frontier (in utility
coordinates) is given by((
8
3
− 6 (y1)2
)3 y1
2
(
1
6
− (y1)2
4
)
,
(
6 (y1)
2 − 4
3
)3 (y1)2
4
√
2
3
−(y1)2
2
)
.
As figure 2 illustrates, the MCE frontier intersects the exchange equilib-
rium utility frontier in one point, D. Thus D is the only C-efficient outcome,
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Figure 2: Minimally constrained efficient frontier
and therefore the only candidate for an equilibrium production plan. Straight-
forward computations show that yD =
(
−2
3
,
√
3
3
,
√
3
3
)
maximizes the adjusted
value V{1,2}yD and thus it is an equilibrium production vector.
Although in this example C = I, the minimally C-efficient production plans
are not necessarily constrained Pareto optimal. Figure 3 illustrates that. How-
ever, since the two frontiers intersect in point D the equilibrium corresponding
to C = {1, 2} is constrained Pareto optimal. In section 5 we will show that
this is a more general result, that applies to economies in which the firm has
no market power in the financial markets. Indeed, in this example, the firm
does not influence the markets by making its equity contract available for trade,
because in every exchange equilibrium, consumers choose not to trade firm’s
shares.
4 The General Model
In this section we present our general model, which extends the previous one in
two directions. First, it allows for more complex financial policies. The firm can
finance its production plan not only by selling equity, but also by borrowing in
the market and issuing new securities. Second, we allow for more general price
perceptions. The control group may be unsure about the exact equilibrium
asset prices and assign, instead, positive probabilities to several possible prices.
15
Figure 3: CPO versus MCE
4.1 The Economy
The market participants have the same characteristics as described in section
3. The market structure is different in that there are J < S exogenously given
securities available for trade at date 0. Security Aj pays ajs units of the state-
contingent consumption good if state s occurs. The matrix A
def
= (ajs)j=1..J
s=1..S
∈
MS×J (R) is called the payoff matrix.
The firm can finance its production plan by borrowing in the existing se-
curity markets and issuing new shares and/or securities9. We assume that the
firm cannot issue more than M new shares and is allowed to design exactly N
firm-specific securities10. N is taken to be large enough11 so that the firm has
the capacity to complete the markets (if that is optimal for its control group).
The payoffs of the securities that the firm may issue to finance a produc-
tion plan y are constrained to lie in some exogenously given set K (y) ⊆ RS.
The set K (y) encompasses the restrictions that firm faces when issuing new
securities. For example, the firm may be constrained to issue only securi-
ties with positive payoff in every state, in which case K (y) ⊆ RS+. Alterna-
tively, K (y) ⊆ {(f(y1), ..., f(yS)) | f : R→ R} means that the firm can issue
only derivatives on its equity (such as options on equity). It is assumed that
0S ∈ K (y) and y1 ∈ K (y) , so that the firm can always choose the trivial finan-
9 Examples of such firm-issued securities are convertibles, warrants, floating-rate debt,
zero-coupons, primes and scores, etc.
10This assumption is made to simplify the technicalities of the model. However, since the
firm is allowed to issue securities with zero payoff in all states, the constraint merely imposes
an upper bound on the number of new securities the firm may issue.
11If unlimited short sales are allowed and A is full rank this means N ≥ S − J.
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cial structure {0S, ...,0S,y1} , where 0S is the zero vector in RS. Let also M be
the exogenously given upper bound on new equity issues.
For every j ∈ {1, ..., J +N + 1} investors are allowed to sell short up to
Lj ∈ [0,+∞] units of the security j. The same constraints are faced by the firm
for its trades in the exogenously given securities. Let L
def
= (L1, ..., LN+J+1)
denote the vector of portfolio bounds.
The firm has to decide on: (a). a production plan y ∈ Y, (b) . a stream
of dividends D ∈ RS to be paid to its shareholders at date 1, (c) . a matrix
of payoffs X ∈ MS×N (R) for the N securities to be issued, (d) . a portfolio12
bf ∈ RJ of asset holdings and (e) . a number θf ∈ R of new shares to issue.13 A
vector P = (y,D,X, bf , θf) ∈ Y× RS×MS×N (R)×RJ+1 is called a production-
financial plan/policy.
Definition 4.1 A production-financial plan
(
y,D,X, bf , θf
)
is called feasible
if:
i. y ∈ Y
ii. D,Xn ∈ K (y) , for every n ∈ {1, ..., N} , where Xn denotes the n-th
column of X,
iii. θf ∈ [−1,M ] and bfj ≥ −Lj for every j ∈ {1, ..., J} ,
iv. y1 =
(
1 + θf
)
D + Abf +X1N , where 1N = (1, ..., 1)
t ∈ RN .
The set of all feasible plans is denoted by F .
If the firm chooses production-financial plan P = (y,D,X, bf , θf) and
(q, p, v) ∈ RJ × RN × R are the market prices of the already existing secu-
rities, the firm-issued securities and the dividend stream, then the firm’s profit
at date 0 is
D0
def
= y0 + qb
f + p1N + θ
fv.
This is distributed to firm’s shareholders according to their initial shares14.
Therefore, if the firm chooses policy P = (y,D,X, bf , θf) , having an initial
endowment of δ shares is equivalent, in terms of wealth generated, to receiving
δy0 units of the date-0 consumption good and being endowed with a portfolio(
δbf , δ1N , δθ
f
)
of the J +N + 1 traded securities.
Hence, every feasible production-financial plan P , generates the following
(artificial) stock-exchange economy:
12 To simplify notation we are assuming that portfolio holdings are column vectors.
13A negative value of θf indicates that the firm repurchases −θf of its outstanding shares.
A positive value indicates that firm is issuing θf additional shares.
14 The situation described in section 3 corresponds to the case in which D0 = y0, D
1 =
y1 ∈ RS+1, bf = 0 ∈ RJ , θf = 0 ∈ R, N = 0.
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EP = ((ui,
(
ωi0 + δ
iy0, ω
1i
)
, δibf , δi1N , δ
iθf )i, A,X,D).
In EP every investor i takes the asset prices as given and chooses his/her
consumption and portfolio by solving:
maxci,bi,ri,θi u
i (ci)
s.t. ci0 + qb
i + pri + vθi = ωi0 + δ
i
(
y0 + qb
f + p1N + vθ
f
)
ci1 = ωi1 + Abi +Xri +Dθi
ci ≥ 0, (bi, ri, θi) ≥ −L.
(5)
Definition 4.2 An equilibrium of the stock-exchange economy EP consists of
prices, (q, p, v) , consumption allocations,
(
ci
)
i=1...I
, and securities holdings,(
b
i
, ri, θ
i
)
i=1...I
, such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1.
(
ci, b
i
, ri, θ
i
)
i=1...I
solves (5) given the prices (q, p, v),
2. all markets clear, i.e.,
I∑
i=1
b
i
= bf ,
I∑
i=1
ri = 1,
I∑
i=1
θ
i
= 1 + θf
I∑
i=1
ci =
I∑
i=1
ωi + y.
4.2 Control Group’s Price Beliefs
The control group’s beliefs are positive probability measures over the space of
asset prices. The beliefs are rational in the sense that they assign zero proba-
bility to all prices that are not among the equilibrium ones. Their construction
is shown in the sequel.
For every P = (y,D,X, bf , θf) ∈ F let ∏˜ (P) ⊆ RJ+N+1 be the set of
equilibrium asset prices of EP . Define Ŷ def=
{
y ∈ Y | y0 ≥ −min ω
i
0
δi
+ ε
}
and
F̂ def=
{
P = (y,D,X, bf , θf) ∈ F | y ∈ Ŷ } , where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small.
Then
∏˜
(P) 6= ∅ for every P ∈F̂ (see the appendix for a proof). We restrict15
the firm’s choices to the feasible production-financial plans in F̂ .
LetM be the space of all measurable selections from ∏˜. We endowM with
the product topology and consider the associated Borel σ-algebra, B (M).
Definition 4.3 Any probability measure, µ, over (M,B (M)) is called a ra-
tional belief for the control group.
15This restriction can be relaxed considerably by enlarging the set of “permissible” pro-
duction plans to a superset of Ŷ . However, that level of generality is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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4.3 Firm’s Objective and the Equilibrium Concept
The firm’s objective is to maximize the expected C-adjusted value, given control
group’s beliefs over the set of equilibrium prices. As in the model of section 3,
the C-adjusted value will be defined as the sum of the fraction of firm’s market
value received by the members of the control group as initial shareholders and a
measure of the members’ surplus from their transactions in the stock markets.
Since investors can trade in many securities, the surplus acquired from their
trade in every marketed security must be taken into account.
We introduce first some notation.
Let µ be control group’s price belief, Π = (q, p, v) ∈ supp(µ) an arbitrary
price functional in the support of µ and P ∈F̂ an arbitrary financial-production
plan in the firm’s action set. Then:
1. ΠP (l) is the price of security l ∈
{
(Aj)j=1,...,J , D, (X
n)n=1,...,N
}
given by
the pricing functional Π. For example, if l = D, then ΠP (l)
def
= v (P),
2. ZiP (l) is consumer i’s optimal holding of security l at prices Π (P),
3. ZCP (l)
def
=
∑
i∈C Z
i
y (l),
4. ci (P) is investor i’s optimal consumption in the economy EP , at prices
Π (P).
Definition 4.4 For P, P ∈ F̂ and a given Π ∈supp(µ) we define the C-
adjusted value of P at P as:
VCP (P)
def
= δC (ΠP (D) +D0) +WP (P) , (6)
where
D0 = y0 + q (P) bf + p (P)1N + v (P) θf and
WP (P) =
∑
l∈(Aj)j ,(Xn)n,D
W lP (P) ,
W lP (P) =
∑
i∈C
ZiP (l)MRS
i
(
ci
(P)) l − ZCP (l) ΠP (l) .
Similarly to our discussion in section 3, we interpret the expression
ZiP (l)
(
MRSi
(
ci
)
l − ΠP (l)
)
as investor i’s surplus from trading security l. ThusW lP (P) measures the control
group’s surplus from trading l and WP (P) is the surplus from all its transac-
tions in the stock markets.
According to definition 4.4, the C-adjusted value depends on every member’s
optimal portfolio. If there are redundant securities in the market, the optimal
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portfolios may not be unique. Investors who trade in at least one redundant
security are, in fact, indifferent among a continuum of portfolios. The C-
adjusted value is well-defined if and only if it is invariant to the choice of
optimal portfolios. Next proposition shows that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 4.5 The C-adjusted value is well-defined.
Proof. Let Π ∈ supp(µ), (P ,P) ∈ F̂ × F̂ and
(
(ZiP (l))l∈(Aj)j ,(Xn)n,D
)
i∈C
a vector of optimal portfolios for the members of the control group. Using
every investor i’s budget constraint (i ∈ C) and rearranging terms in (4.4) we
obtain:
VCP (P) =
∑
i∈C
(
ci0 (P)− ωi0
)
+
∑
i∈C
MRSi
(
ci1
(P)) (ci1 (P)− ωi1) . (7)
Since ui is strictly quasi-concave, the optimal consumption stream ci (P)
is unique and thus the value of VCP (P) is independent of the choice of the
members’ optimal portfolios.
The firm’s objective is to maximize its expected C-adjusted value, given its
beliefs. This means, maxP Eµ(VCP (P)) =
∫
M VCP (P) dµ (Π) . Note that the in-
tegral
∫
M VCP (P) dµ (Π) is well-defined because, given the product topology on
M, the mapping Π 7−→ Π(P) from M to RJ+N+1 is continuous (and thus in-
tegrable) for every P . Moreover, consumers’ demands for goods are continuous
functions of prices.
Let µ denote the control group’s rational beliefs over the set of equilibrium
asset prices.
Definition 4.6 An equilibrium of the production economy consists of: (1).
some rational belief, µ, (2). a production-financial plan P ∈ F̂ for the firm,
(3). a consumption-portfolio allocation for the investors,
(
ci, b
i
, ri, θ
i
)
i=1...I
,
and (4). a system of prices, (q, p, v) , such that:
i. consumption-portfolio allocations are optimal within each investor’s bud-
get constraint, i.e.,
(
ci, b
i
, ri, θ
i
)
i=1...I
solves (5) given (q, p, v) ,
ii. beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium prices, i.e., there exists Π ∈
supp(µ) such that (q, p, v) = Π
(P) ,
iii. the firm maximizes its expected C-adjusted value at P , given the beliefs
µ, i.e., P ∈ argmaxP
∫
M VCP (P) dµ (Π) ,
iv. all markets clear.
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4.4 C-efficient Policies
We say that a production-financial plan is not C-efficient if for every price in the
support of the control group’s beliefs, there exists another production-financial
plan and a system of date-0 transfers that lead to an improvement in everyone
member’s utility. The formal definition follows.
Definition 4.7 Let µ be the control group’s beliefs over M. A production-
financial plan P is not C-efficient (given µ) if there exists a production-financial
plan P and a system of date 0 transfers (τ i)i∈C such that,
∑
τ i ≤ 0 and, for
every Π ∈ supp(µ) ,
a) ui (ci (P) + τ ie0) ≥ ui
(
ci
(P)) for every i ∈ C,
b) uj (ci (P) + τ ie0) > uj
(
ci
(P)) for some j ∈ C.
Theorem 4.8 In every equilibrium of the production economy the firm’s production-
financial plan is C-efficient.
Proof. Let P be an equilibrium production-financial plan corresponding
to belief µ. If it is not C-efficient then there exists an alternative plan, P , and
a system of transfers at time 0, (τ i)i∈C , such that
∑
i∈C τ
i ≤ 0 and, for every
Π ∈ supp(µ) , ui (ci (P) + τ ie0) ≥ ui
(
ci
(P)) ∀i ∈ C, with at least one strict
inequality for some j ∈ C.
Strict quasi-concavity of ui implies that:
ci0 (P) + τ i − ci0
(P)+MRSi (ci (P)) [ci1 (P)− ci1 (P)] ≥ 0,
for every i ∈ C, with strict inequality for some j ∈ C.
Adding up over i ∈ C and using ∑i∈C τ i ≤ 0 yields∑
i∈C
(
ci0 (P)− ci0
(P))+∑
i∈C
MRSi
(
ci
(P)) [ci1 (P)− ci1 (P)]> 0,
or, equivalently,
∑
i∈C
(
ci0 (P)− ωi0
)
+
∑
i∈C
MRSi
(
ci
(P)) [ci1 (P)− ci1 (P)]>∑
i∈C
(
ci0
(P)− ωi0) .
(8)
Using (6), inequality (8) becomes VCP (P) > VCP
(P). Integrating this last in-
equality over Π ∈ supp(µ) we obtain Eµ (VCP (P)) > Eµ (VCP (P)) which is a
contradiction with the equilibrium condition (ii).
5 Shareholders Unanimity and Firm’s Market
Power
A firm that acts in an incomplete market environment may affect the market
prices through two channels: its production choices and its financial policy.
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In this section we restrict attention to firms whose production choices have
no impact on the market prices. We call such firm competitive in the goods
markets.
If, in addition, the spanning condition holds (i.e., K (y) ⊆ span (A) for every
y ∈ Y ) any security that the firm may issue is replicable by a portfolio of the
exogenously given assets, and thus a change in the firm’s financial policy has
no influence on the market equilibrium either. Thus the firm is competitive in
both, the goods and the financial markets. In this case, its C-adjusted value
coincides with the (unambiguously defined) market value and is independent of
the choice of the financial policy. Modigliani-Miller theorem holds and the firm’s
shareholders unanimously agree on the value-maximizing production plan.
If spanning does not hold (i.e., K (y) " span (A) for at least some y ∈ Y ), a
firm that is competitive in the goods market may still influence the equilibrium
prices through its issuing of new securities. As shown by Diamond in [5],
shareholders’ unanimity can still be obtained in this case if the firm’s production
set projects on RS along an 1-dimensional subspace.
This section identifies more general conditions under which unanimity of the
firm’s shareholders on the most preferred production-financial plan obtains. We
show that, when concerned with the shareholders’ unanimity for all profiles of
preferences, spanning and the Diamond-type technology are necessary and suf-
ficient conditions. For particular subclasses of preferences (i.e., linear risk tol-
erant and mean-variance), less restrictive conditions are sufficient to guarantee
the shareholders’ unanimity.
Definition 5.1 A firm is said to be competitive in the goods markets if and only
if, for any feasible plans P and P ′ for which span (A,X,D) = span (A,X ′, D′),
it is true that ΠP (l) = ΠP ′ (l) for every l ∈ span (A,X,D).
Let X ⊆ R− ×R+ be an arbitrary set with 0 ∈ X and ϑ ∈ RS+ an arbitrary
vector. We say that a firm has a Diamond-type technology if its production
set is of the form Y
def
= {(y0, ϑk) | (y0, k) ∈ X} , and K (y) = {0, ϑk} for any
y = (y0, ϑk) ∈ Y . Therefore, a firm with Diamond-type technology is restricted
to finance its production by issuing only equity, and may expand the asset span
along a single direction.
Proposition 5.2 For a firm that is competitive in the goods markets and has a
Diamond-type technology, the maximization of the (expected) C-adjusted value
coincides with the maximization of the (expected) market value, which is unan-
imously supported by all shareholders.
Proof. Since the firm is restricted to issuing equity only, its C-adjusted
value is:
VCy (y) =δC
(
Π
(
y1
)
+ y0
)
+
∑
i∈C
θi (y)
(
MRSi (y) y1 − Π (y1)) .
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Since y1 and y1 are colinear and the firm is competitive in the goods markets,
MRSi (y) y1 − Π(y1) = 0 and thus VCy (y) =δC (Π (y1) + y0).
As proved above, shareholders’ unanimity is obtained if the firm’s technology
satisfies the spanning property or is of the Diamond-type. These restrictions
on the firm’s technology are also necessary for obtaining the shareholders’ una-
nimity within the entire class of rational preference profiles. In other words,
if the firm’s technology does not satisfy the spanning property and is not of
Diamond-type then, by appropriately choosing the shareholders’ preferences,
one can construct economies in which shareholders disagree on their most pre-
ferred production-financial plan.
Therefore, obtaining shareholders’ unanimity for all arbitrary profiles of
their preferences imposes strong restrictions on the firm’s technology. By con-
trast, within the class of market economies in which consumers have either
mean-variance or linear risk tolerance utilities, shareholders’ unanimity is ob-
tained for any technology. In such economies, the firm’s objective renders its
financial policy trivial and the maximization of the C-adjusted value coincides
with Grossman and Hart’ value maximization.
Definition 5.3 Let y ∈ Ŷ and (ci)i∈I be a feasible consumption allocation for
the exchange economy corresponding to y. (i.e.,
∑
i c
i = y+
∑
i ω
i). Then (ci)i∈I
is called distribution-efficient if it is Pareto optimal in the exchange economy
corresponding to y.
Proposition 5.4 (LRT utilities) Suppose that the exogenously given asset
market contains the risk-free bond, as well as every investor’s initial endow-
ment of goods. If investors’ preferences can be represented by expected utilities
with linear risk tolerance and positive identical slopes, then the firm’s financial
policy is irrelevant and the equilibrium allocation is distribution-efficient. If,
moreover, C = I, the equilibrium production plan, y satisfies:
y ∈ argmax{y0 +MRS(y)y1} ,
where MRS(y) denotes investors’ common intertemporal marginal rate of sub-
stitution.
Proof. If investors’ utilities have linear risk tolerance with the same slope,
then every distribution-efficient allocation can be achieved by holding a port-
folio composed of the risk-free and the market security (i.e., the aggregate
endowment). Since for every financial policy that finances a production plan
y the asset span contains both the risk-free bond and the market security, all
distribution-efficient allocations corresponding to y are in the asset span. More-
over, since every feasible allocation (for the exchange economy corresponding to
y) is weakly dominated by a distribution-efficient allocation corresponding to y,
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it follows that every exchange equilibrium in the associated stock-market econ-
omy has the two-fund spanning property and thus all financial policies generate
the same equilibrium consumption stream as the equity-financed plan. There-
fore, the financial policy is irrelevant in this case (consequence of proposition
4.5) and the equilibrium allocation is distribution-efficient.
Since the equilibrium is distribution-efficient, investors’ intertemporal marginal
rates of substitutions are equal, and thusMRSi(y) =MRSj(y)
def
= MRS(y) for
every i, j ∈ I. If C = I then θC(y) = 1 and thus y ∈ argmax {y0 +MRS(y)y1}.
Suppose now that investors’ utilities ui are quasi-concave and satisfy:
ui
(
ci
)
= hi
(
ci0, E
(
ci1
)
, var
(
ci1
))
, ∀i ∈ I
with hi differentiable, increasing in the first two variables and decreasing in the
third. Suppose, as in the previous example that C = I and the risk-free bond,
as well as investors’ initial endowments of goods are in the asset span.
Proposition 5.5 (CAPM Equilibrium) Under the above stated assump-
tions, the equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal and firm’s equilibrium pro-
duction plan satisfies:
y ∈ argmax{y0 +MRS(y)y1} . (9)
Proof. Given the particular preferences, every equilibrium production plan
y generates distribution-efficient consumption allocations (see Magill-Quinzii
[18], pp. 181-183 for a proof). Then, as before, investors’ marginal rates of
substitution are equalized at the equilibrium and firms’ objective becomes the
one in formula (9).
5.1 Competitiveness in Financial Markets
As emphasized before, if the spanning property holds, a firm’s financial policy
alone has no influence on the market equilibrium. We identify here more general
conditions that guarantee firm’s competitiveness in the financial markets and
analyze their equilibrium implications. We show that if a firm is competitive in
the financial markets, then its C-adjusted value is unaffected by the financial
policy and thus it is irrelevant how the firm finances its investment. If the
firm is competitive in both, the financial and the goods markets, its C-adjusted
value coincides with the Grossman-Hart objective. If, in addition, there is
no production-specific risk, i.e., if Y ⊆ span (A) (one instance in which this
happens is if markets are complete, i.e., span (A) = RS), then the C-adjusted
value coincides with the (unambiguously defined) firm’s market value. The
production plans that maximize the firm’s market value are the most preferred
production plans by all shareholders.
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We assume, throughout this section that unlimited short sales are allowed.
For every y ∈ Y consider the artificial stock-exchange economy E0y in which
the market structure is given by the payoff matrix A, investors’s preferences are
the same as before, their endowments of goods are ωi+δiy and their endowments
of securities are 0. E0y is therefore an imaginary stock-exchange economy in
which firm has committed to producing y but its stock is not traded in the
market. For every l ∈ RS, let E ly be the economy with the same characteristics
as E0y , except that its market structure is given by (A, l) ∈MS×(J+1).
Let Ŷ be the set of production plans for which E0y has a stock-exchange equi-
librium and assume that the equilibrium is unique16. Let that be (ci (y) , bi (y) , q (y))i∈I .
Define
Dy def=
{
l ∈ RS |MRSi (ci (y)) l =MRSj (cj (y)) l, ∀i 6= j ∈ I} .
The set Dy is called the extended asset span corresponding to y. Clearly,
span (A) ⊆ Dy, but the inclusion may be strict. If span (A) $ Dy and the equi-
librium consumption allocation (ci(y))i∈I is interior, then any security whose
payoff lies in Dy \ span (A) has the property that, if introduced into the mar-
ket, it does not change the equilibrium prices or allocations. The following
proposition states this property formally.
Proposition 5.6 Let l ∈ Dy \ span (A) and p (y) = MRSi (ci (y)) l, i ∈ I. If
(ci (y))i∈I is interior, then consumption allocation (c
i (y))i∈I , portfolio holdings
(bi (y) , 0)i∈I and prices (q (y) , p (y)) form an equilibrium of the economy E ly.
Proof. Since ci(y)≫ 0 ∀i ∈ I and p(y) =MRSi (ci(y)) l =MRSj (c(y)j) l,
∀i 6= j ∈ I, the first order conditions for the consumption choice in E ly, given
(q(y), p(y)) , are satisfied at (ci(y))i∈I . Quasi-concavity of investors’ utility func-
tions imply that the first order conditions are sufficient and thus((
ci(y),
(
bi(y), 0
))
i∈I , (q(y), p(y))
)
is an equilibrium in E ly.
Definition 5.7 We say that the firm is competitive (or has no market power)
in the financial markets if K (y) ⊆ Dy for every y ∈ Ŷ .
If the firm is competitive in the financial markets, any security it may issue
has no effect on the equilibrium prices of the other traded securities or on
the equilibrium consumption allocations. Therefore investors are indifferent
between having the markets for the firm-specific securities open or closed. Being
competitive in the financial markets does not mean that the firm’s decisions do
not influence the markets. It means only that its financial policy has no impact
on the markets. However, changes in the production plan can still affect prices.
16This assumption is made only to simplify the exposition and it is not necessary for
deriving the results of this section.
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If the firm is competitive in the financial markets then, for every feasible
production-financial plan P = (y,X,D, θf , bf) , there exists an exchange equi-
librium of EP in which investor i’s holdings of firm’s securities are: ZiP (D) =
δi
(
1 + θf
)
and ZiP (l) = δ
i,∀l ∈
{
X
1
, ...XN
}
. Since holding a share δi of the
firm is equivalent to holding that fraction of the firm’s portfolio, the last con-
dition actually says that, if the firm is competitive, investors’ net trades in the
securities issued by the firm are zero.
Competitiveness in the financial markets implies that the C-adjusted value is
invariant to changes in the financial policies. This is an immediate consequence
of formula (7) and proposition 4.5. The C-adjusted value of a firm that is
competitive in the financial markets is:
VCP (P) = δCy0 +
∑
i∈C
δiMRSi
(
ci (y)
)
y1 + bC (y) (q (y)− q (y)) .
Definition 5.8 The firm is called competitive in all markets (or simply, com-
petitive) if it is competitive in both, goods and financial markets17.
The following proposition shows that the C-adjusted value can be seen as a
generalization of Grossman-Hart’s objective, since it coincides with that if the
firm is competitive.
Proposition 5.9 If the firm is competitive, its C-adjusted value coincides with
the Grossman-Hart objective.
If, in addition, Ŷ 1 ⊆ span (A) , ∀y ∈ Ŷ then the C-adjusted value coincides
with firm’s market value. Production plans that maximize firm’s market value
are every shareholder’s most preferred plans.
Proof. Let µ be the control group’s price beliefs and Π ∈ supp(µ) arbitrary.
As proved above, competitiveness in the financial markets implies
VCP (P) = δCy0 +
∑
i∈C
δiMRSi
(
ci (y)
)
y1 + bC (y) (q (y)− q (y)) ,
while competitiveness in the goods market implies q (y)− q (y) = 0 and thus
VCP (P) = δCy0 +
∑
i∈C
δiMRSi
(
ci (y)
)
y1.
If span (K (y)) ⊇ Ŷ 1, then, in particular, MRSi (ci) y1 = MRSj (cj) y1
for every i, j ∈ I and all y ∈ Ŷ . Therefore, investors unanimously support
the maximization of the C-adjusted value, which becomes: VCP (P) = y0 +
MRSi
(
ci
)
y1 = y0 +MRS
j
(
cj
)
y1, ∀i, j ∈ I.
17The definition of competitiveness adopted here differs from Makowski’s, [19] which re-
quires that investors’ holdings of the firm-issued securities be 0. For strictly convex prefer-
ences, Makowski’s definition of competitiveness implies spanning; ours does not.
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The firm in example 1 of section 2 is competitive in financial markets and
C = I. Therefore, for that example, the C-adjusted value and Grossman-Hart
objective coincide.
It should be emphasized, that firm’s competitiveness does not imply that
Grossman-Hart competitive price perceptions are correct everywhere. They
only generate some preferences for the control group’s members whose peaks
coincide with their actual most preferred production plans.
Whenever the firm is not competitive, following Grossman-Hart or Dre`ze
objective can generate less social welfare for the members of the control group
than by maximizing the C-adjusted value.
6 Existence and Pareto Optimality of Equi-
libria
Theorem 6.1 If L ≪ +∞, the mapping y 7→ K (y) is upper hemi-continuous
and compact-valued and investors’ utilities are strictly increasing in every com-
ponent, then an equilibrium in which the firm maximizes the expected C-adjusted
value exists.
The proof of the theorem is delegated to the appendix18.
An important characteristic of the equilibrium in which firm maximizes its
C-adjusted value is that the financial policy is no longer irrelevant (as it was
in Dre`ze’s and Grossman & Hart’s models). Two financial plans that finance
the same production plan but generate different asset spans may give different
utilities to the members of the control group and thus may be ranked differently.
Hence, Modigliani-Miller theorem does not necessarily hold.
Since members of the control group decide the optimal production-financial
plan based on their attitudes toward risk and their needs for risk hedging op-
portunities, a natural question arises: Is the optimal plan the one that creates
a complete asset structure? The answer is in general negative, as shown by the
following example. Thus, we should expect an incomplete asset structure to
arise at the equilibrium. Given the endogenous market incompleteness, it is not
surprising to see that equilibria are, in general, Pareto suboptimal. However,
particular types of preferences for the investors do generate Pareto optimal
allocations at the equilibrium and thus effectively complete markets (in the
terminology of Elul [12]).
Example 3
Consider a two-date economy with three states of nature at date t = 1.
There are two investors and one firm. Firm’s production set consists of only one
18Note that the existence theorem in Kelsey-Milne [15] cannot be applied here because
firm’s preference relation fails to satisfy the required convexity property.
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plan: Y = {(−1, 0,−1, 1)} . This firm can be interpreted as being a financial
intermediary that owns the security (0,−1, 1) and incurs a cost of 1 unit of
date-0 consumption for trading it in the market. Investors’ characteristics are:
u1(c) = c0 + log c1 + 2 log c2, ω
1 = (2, 1, 2, 4) , δ1 = 1
u2(c) = c0 + log c3, ω
2 = (1, 5, 0, 0) , δ2 = 0.
There are no exogenously given assets that can be traded in the market.
Suppose first that the firm chooses to finance its plan by issuing only equity.
Denote this financial plan by P0. Given P0, the first investor solves
max {c0 + log c1 + 2 log c2}
s.t. c0 + θv = 2 + v − 1
c1 = 1, c2 = 2− θ, c3 = 4 + θ
ci ≥ 0, i = 0, .., 3
and thus chooses θ1 = −4.
The second investor solves
max {c0 + log c3}
s.t. c0 + θv = 1
c1 = 5, c2 = 5− θ, c3 = θ
ci ≥ 0, i = 0, .., 3
and chooses θ2 = 1
v
for 0 < v ≤ 1
5
.
The stock market equilibrium dictates then v = 1
5
and thus c10 = 2, c
1
1 = 1,
c12 = 6, c
1
3 = 0, which gives investor 1 an utility U
1
im = 2 + 2 log 6. The firm’s
market value is −1 + 1
5
= −4
5
. Using formula (7) to compute the C-adjusted
value we obtain
V{1}P0 (P0) = 2− 2 +
(
1,
1
3
, 0
) 16
0
−
 12
4
 = 4
3
.
Assume now that the firm chooses a financial plan that completes the
markets. Denote that financial plan by Pc. Given Pc, investors solve
max {c0 + log c1 + 2 log c2}
s.t. c0 + p1c1 + p2c2 + p3c3 = 2 + p1 + 2p2 + 4p3 + (−1− p2 + p3)
ci ≥ 0, i = 0, .., 3
and 
max {c0 + log c3}
s.t. c0 + p1c1 + p2c2 + p3c3 = 1 + 5p1 + 5p2
ci ≥ 0, i = 0, .., 3.
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In equilibrium, p1 =
6
45
, p2 =
12
45
, p3 =
1
5
and c10 = 0, c
1
1 = 6, c
1
2 = 6, c
1
3 = 0
which gives investor 1 a utility U1cm = 3 log 6 < 2 + 2 log 6 = U
1
im. Hence, the
owner of the firm does not want its firm to issue enough securities to complete
the markets.
If Pc is chosen, the market value of the firm is −1 − 1245 + 15 = −1615 ; the
C-adjusted value of Pc at P0 is:
V{1}P0 (Pc) = 0− 2 +
(
1,
1
3
, 0
) 66
0
−
 12
0
 = 4
3
− 7 < 4
3
.
The example is robust in the sense that the results still hold if we slightly
perturb the endowments.
7 Appendix
Proof of theorem 6.1
The proof is based on the observation that, for a given rational belief of
the control group, µ, there is a bijection between the set of equilibria of the
production economy which are consistent with µ and the set of Nash equilibria
of a two-player imitation game that will be constructed here.
We start by proving some preparatory lemmas.
Lemma 7.1 The economy EP has an equilibrium for every P ∈F̂ .
Proof. Notice first that the economy EP is equivalent to a standard stock-
exchange economy, E0P , in which
1. consumers’ endowments of goods are
(
ωi + δiy
)
i∈I ,
2. asset structure is given by (A,X,D) ,
3. there is no initial endowment of assets,
4. consumers face “personalized” short-sale bounds, Li,P ∈ RJ+N+1, given
by:
(a) Lj + δ
ibf for every exogenously given security j,
(b) Ln + δ
i for every firm-issued security n,
(c) Ld + δ
i
(
1 + θf
)
for the firm’s shares.
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Since y ∈ Ŷ , every consumer’s endowment of goods in E0P is strictly positive.
The proof of the existence of an equilibrium for E0P is similar to the stan-
dard Arrow-Debreu existence proof. The reader is referred to Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis19, [13] for the details. An important step in the proof is the
construction of an appropriate convex and compact price space. For our spec-
ification of the model, that set is defined as follows. Let λ0 be the price of
date-0 consumption in some units of account and let pi the price vector of the
J +N + 1 assets (expressed in the same units). Let
Q
def
=
{
(λ0, pi) ∈ R+ × RJ+N+1 | ∃λ ∈ RS+ s.t. pi = λ (A,X,D)
}
.
Clearly, Q is a convex and closed cone. If Q does not contain a full line
then there exists a hyperplane H ⊆ RJ+N+2 (of dimension J+N +1) such that
0 6= (λ0, piq) ∈ Q if and only if α (λ0, pi) ∈ Q ∩H for some α > 0. If Q contains
a full line we take H to be half the unit sphere in RJ+N+2, centered at origin.
Let Q0
def
= Q∩H be the price space. Then Q0 is a convex and compact set (or
an acyclic absolute neighborhood retract if H is the half sphere).
Let
∏˜0
(P) be the set of normalized equilibrium prices of E0P . Thus
∏˜0
:
F̂ ⇉ Q0 and ∏˜ (P) = {(1, pi
λ0
)
| (λ0, pi) ∈
∏˜0
(P)
}
.
Lemma 7.2 The equilibrium price correspondence
∏˜0
: F̂ ⇉ Q0 is upper
hemi-continuous, with compact values.
Proof.
It is enough to show that
∏˜0
has closed graph.
For that, notice first that the equilibrium portfolios are bounded, due to
the short sale constraints. Let K be a cube in RJ+N+1, large enough so that
it contains all the portfolio bounds. Consider the truncated portfolio demands
ZiK : F̂ ×Q0 ⇉ K. Then ZiK has non-empty, convex and compact values, and is
upper hemi-continuous at every (P , pi) ∈ F̂×Q0 with λ0
(
ω0 + δ
iy0
)
+piLi,P 6= 0.
To overcome the possible discontinuity of the demand at points (P , pi) ∈
F̂ ×Q0 for which λ0
(
ω0 + δ
iy0
)
+piLi,P = 0, we construct a smoothed demand
correspondence, ẐiK , and a quasi-equilibrium as in [4]. It can be shown that
every quasi-equilibrium of E0P is an equilibrium and that the smoothed demand
correspondence is upper hemi-continuous everywhere.
The closed graph property of
∏˜0
follows now immediately from the upper-
hemi-continuity of the smoothed aggregate demand. Since Q0 is compact, this
implies that
∏˜0
is upper hemi-continuous with compact values.
The rest of the proof will proceed in 3 steps.
19Their proof is given for economies with unlimited short-sales. Portfolio constraints only
simplify the problem, as it is enough to prove existence of an equilibrium for the truncated
economy.
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Step 1 . Construction of the game.
For a given µ ∈ M we construct a normal form two-player game, Γµ, as
follows:
• The strategy set of each player is
F̂ ′ =
{
P = (y,X,D, bf , θf) ∈ F̂ | (bf ,0N , 0) ∈ K} .
• The first player’s payoff function is
Φ1µ (P1,P2) = −‖P1 − P2‖ ,
where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean norm on R2S+SN+J+2 (we are considering P1
and P2 as (2S + SN + J + 2)-dimensional vectors here).
• The second player’s payoff function is
Φ2µ (P1,P2) =
∫
M
VCP1 (P2) dµ (Π) .
It is easy to see that P is an equilibrium production-financial plan consistent
with the belief µ if and only if (P ,P) is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γµ.
Step 2 : The strategy space F̂ ′ is compact.
We prove first that Ŷ is compact. Since Ŷ is a closed subset of RS+1, it
is enough to prove that it is bounded. Suppose it is not. Then there exists a
sequence (yn)n ⊆ Ŷ such that ‖yn‖ > n, ∀n ≥ 1. Convexity of Ŷ together with
0 ∈ Ŷ implies then:
1
‖yn‖y
n +
(
1− 1‖yn‖
)
0 ∈ Ŷ , ∀n ≥ 1.
Since
∥∥∥ 1‖yn‖yn∥∥∥ = 1, we can assume, without loss of generality, that 1‖yn‖yn →
y ∈ RS+1, with ‖y0‖ = 1. Ŷ closed implies then that y ∈ Ŷ .
On the other hand, yn ∈ Ŷ =⇒ yn ≥ (−mini ω0δi + ε, 0, ...0) and therefore
limn→∞
1
‖yn‖y
n ≥ −limn→∞
(−mini ω0δi , 0, ...0)
‖yn‖ = 0.
Hence, y = 0, which contradicts ‖y‖ = 1.
F̂ ′ compact follows now immediately from Ŷ and K being compact and
y 7−→ K (y) being upper hemi-continuous with compact values.
Step 3 : There exists a probability measure µ such that the game Γµ has a
Nash equilibrium.
To prove that we show that the family of games (Γµ)µ∈M induces a game
with endogenous sharing rules that satisfies all the hypotheses of the main
theorem in [21].
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Define the payoff correspondences:
Q1, Q1 : F̂ ′ × F̂ ′ ⇉ R2
Q1 (P1,P2) = −‖P1 − P2‖ ,
Q2 (P1,P2) =
{∫
M
V˜P1 (P2) dµ (Π) | µ= probability on M
}
.
The game satisfy the hypotheses of the main theorem in [21] if (a) the
strategy sets are compact metric spaces, and (b) correspondences Q1 and Q2
are upper hemi-continuous with compact and convex values.
a) The strategy space F̂ ′ is a metric space with the metric induced by the
Euclidian metric of R2S+SN+J+2. According to step 2, it is also compact.
b) Q1 is a continuous function and thus upper hemi-continuous as a corre-
spondence. Clearly, it has compact and convex values. Upper hemi-continuity
of Q2 (as well as compactness of its values) follows immediately from the up-
per hemi-continuity and compactness of the values of
∏˜0
, together with the
continuity of the optimal consumption as a function of prices and endowments.
Convexity of values follows from the linearity of the integral with respect to µ.
Therefore, there exists a probability measure µ such that the game Γµ has
a Nash equilibrium.
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